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William C. Schaab*
Prior Appropriation, Impairment,
Replacements, Models and Markets
Water law is the doctrine on which we rely to provide enough water
for those who need it. Legal doctrine, however, only defines entitlements,
rights to take and use, and procedures for resolving conflicts; it does not
match demand and supply. But market transactions, which allow available
supplies to meet effective demands for water, depend upon legal doctrine
to establish ownership. A reasonable buyer will not pay the price unless
the seller has the right to sell, and the buyer can enjoy what he pays for.
Theoretically, a free and open water rights market would measure the
available supply and identify needs according to ability to pay the market
price. As scarcity increased, prices would rise, less valuable uses would
give way to the more valuable, and water would always be available for
new, high-value purposes.
In fact, though, markets capable of allocating water to satisfy all de-
mands throughout the west have not developed, I and one important reason
is the prior appropriation doctrine itself. This doctrine, which was con-
cerned primarily with new appropriations, ignored established uses. These
*B.A. and M.A. Wesleyan University, J.D. Yale Law School; member of Rodey, Dickason, Sloan,
Akin & Robb, P.A. and its predecessors in Albuquerque, New Mexico since 1959.
1. Economic analysts have found that "the existence of market transactions for water reflecting
the free play of forces of supply and demand are rare, although not nonexistent." R. YOUNG &
S. GRAY, ECONOMIC VALUE OF WATER: CONCEPTS AND EMPIRICAL ESTIMATES 80-
81 (1972) (Nat'l Water Comm'n Study). In the absence of market indications of value, they analyzed
economic "models" created by WOLLMAN & BONEM, OUTLOOK FOR WATER QUALITY,
QUANTITY AND NATIONAL GROWTH (1971). C. MEYERS & R. POSNER, MARKET
TRANSFERS OF WATER RIGHTS 8 (1971) (Nat'l Water Comm'n, Legal Study No. 4), found
market transfers "extremely rare" with no record of any activity in California between 1959 and
1969; however, some Colorado municipalities had purchased water rights. Khoshakhlagh, Brown
& DuMars, FORECASTING FUTURE MARKET VALUES FOR WATER RIGHTS IN NEW MEX-
ICO, N.M. Water Resources Research Inst. Rept. No. 092, Las Cruces (1977), found some data
on market sales of New Mexico water rights between 1970 and 1975, but Brown, Conflicting Claims
to Southwestern Water: The Equity and Management Issues, I SW. REV. OF MGMT. AND ECON.
35, 59-60 (1981), found "sparse" evidence of water rights markets and water rights values. Ellis
& DuMars, The Two-Tiered Market in Western Water, 57 NEB. L. REV. 333, 357 n. 83 (1978),
noted that a jurisdictional conflict between the State Engineer and a local conservancy district had
"destroyed" a market for the district's excess water. Constructing the "value" of water rights with
abstract and theoretical mathematical "models," as in several National Water Commission studies,
is of doubtful usefulness: W. BUTCHER, N. WHITTLESEY & J. ORSBORN, ECONOMIC VALUE
OF WATER IN A SYSTEMS CONTEXT (1972); R. THOMPSON, M. L. HYATT, J. McFARLAND,
& H. P. YOUNG, FORECASTING WATER DEMANDS (1971); and R. DAVIS, PRICING AND
EFFICIENCY IN WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (1971).
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private property rights became subject to supervening public control;
water rights, unlike land,2 were not freely transferable.
In the absence of systematic adjudication of existing rights and scientific
measurement of available supplies,3 no one knew how much should be
bought or from whom.' Thus, negotiated sales might be limited to fi-
nancial settlements to dispose of damage actions. The solution to inad-
equate supplies was usually not purchase of existing rights but political
efforts to obtain massive public investment programs to augment natural
supplies with storage and distribution systems. As long as the government
stood ready to finance such projects, significant private markets were not
likely to develop.
In the last few years, development of digital, computer-operated sim-
ulations has made it possible to create water basin "models" that plot
requirements against available resources and project the long-term con-
sequences of development and use. The need to quantify federal and
Indian water rights throughout the West is producing adjudications of
existing and foreseeable diversions and depletions. With such public
assistance to the supply and demand sides of water use coupled with legal
devices to escape the undesired consequences of the prior appropriation
doctrine, effective markets may at last be created with a corresponding
reduction in the control of state bureaucracies over water allocation.
The prior appropriation doctrine allowed the staking of a claim against
a water supply, regardless of the extent of the resource, and was therefore
helpless to prevent "over appropriation" of the available supply.5 In times
of shortage, the doctrine would compel complete curtailment of all junior
uses, regardless of importance, to ensure the complete fulfillment of a
senior right. In most western states, few "water rights" have been ad-
2. Grant, Reasonable Groundwater Pumping Levels Under the Appropriation Doctrine: The Law
and Underlying Economic Goals, 21 NAT. RES. J. 1, 29-32 (1981), notes that theoretical insecurity
of rights did not impede water development in states, like Texas, that failed to apply the prior
appropriation doctrine to groundwater.
3. Ten years ago Professor Charles E. Corker recommended, "... there can be no higher priority
for study . . . than the subject of water supply determination." C. CORKER, GROUNDWATER
LAW, MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION 29 (1971) (Nat'l Water Comm'n Rept. No. 6).
The same judgment is true today.
4. The prior appropriation system did not encourage market-created adjustments of priorities
without major economic dislocations. A junior user who wished to strengthen the security of his
right by upping its priority would have to obtain waivers or covenants not to sue from all senior
interests, yet he had no reliable way to identify such interests. Declarations of vested rights are
typically not mandated, and they may be filed in vague and general terms, if the stream system had
notbeen adjudicated. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 72-1-3 (1978). Therefore, his only remedy would have
been purchase of an entire senior right, typically forcing agricultural land out of production when
the actual need could have been satisfied by less drastic and less costly action.
5. By far the best analysis of the prior appropriation doctrine is CHARLES J. MEYERS, A
HISTORICAL AND FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE APPROPRIATION SYSTEM (1971)
(Nat'l Water Comm'n Legal Study No. 1).
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judicated, and a prospective buyer could not be certain of the seller's
priority and entitlement, or the buyer's ability to enjoy the purchased
rights. Because supplies were indefinite and the effects of others' long-
term uses on his rights could not be forecast, the buyer could not accu-
rately estimate the risk of future curtailment. Moreover, the doctrine could
not, in all situations, prevent waste; in the name of protecting the senior
rights of the first user, it could prevent full or optimum use of some
streams and groundwater reservoirs. A resource specialist recently con-
cluded: "State laws and policies not only allow an inefficient use of
western water, they ensure it by reducing or eliminating the incentives
and opportunities for transferring water to high-value uses." ' 6 In retro-
spect, adoption of prior appropriation as basic, constitutional doctrine
was unfortunate. 7
The prior appropriation doctrine developed in California in the first
decade after the American conquest. 8 Congress had failed to prescribe
legislative rules to govern water use on the new public domain, and
miners without title based their use of water from streams on their being
first on the scene. 9 The prior appropriation doctrine merely validated
necessary water use by gold miners who extended "flumes and ditches
.. . along the canyon walls to turn great wheels and creaking pumps. " 10
By 1855 the state supreme court had approved the "customary" rule of
a mere seven years' standing, regulating water use among the gold miners
on the basis of an equitable maxim: Qui prior est in tempore, potior est
in jure." Both ownership of land and riparian use of flowing streams,
the premises of common law rules for water use, were ignored or sub-
ordinated. "Mining was paramount to all other interests in the early days,
and its followers could wash away roads and soils, undermine houses,
and honey-comb or remove entire towns." 2 The miners' control of water
was the compelling justification. Neither the parties nor the courts were
concerned with "policy" questions; no one asked whether the miners'
6. Frederick, The Future Role of Western Irrigation, I SW. REV. OF MGMT. AND ECON.
19, 31 (1981).
7. Burness & Quirk, Water Law, Water Transfers, and Economic Efficiency: The Colorado River,
23 J. LAW & ECON. 111, 121 (1980), purport to demonstrate that "equal sharing leads to greater
aggregate profits than does the appropriation doctrine."
8. Wiel's attempt to anchor the appropriation doctrine to early English precedents failed. Compare
Wiel, Waters: American Law and French Authority, 33 HARV. L. REV. 133 (1919), with Maass &
Zobel, Anglo-American Water Law. Who Appropriated the Reparian Doctrine, 10 PUB. POLICY
YR. BOOK, HARV. SCH. PUB. ADMIN. 120 (1960).
9. 1 WIEL, WATER RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN STATES, 66-117 (3d ed. 1911).
10. 6 BANCROFT, HISTORY OF CALIFORNIA 387 (San Francisco 1888).
11. Irvin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140, 147 (1855). 1 WIEL, supra note 9, §77.
12. BANCROFT, supra note 10, at 402. The miners gave us the phrase "cleaned up" from their
practice of collecting gold flakes from the cleats and riffles of sluice boxes. WELLS & PETERSON,
THE '49ers 160 (1949).
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"custom" would be the best rule to allocate unreckoned resources against
varied needs as the population and the economy grew.
In the century that followed, the prior appropriation rule was adopted
throughout the western states with local variations. 13 The doctrine, how-
ever, did not govern groundwater under common law, 4 the rights of
Indian tribes and pueblos under federal law, '5 municipal "pueblo" rights
based on Spanish law,' 6 the proprietary rights of the federal government, 17
and "private" water in possession of the landowner.'8 Nor did it govern
water pollution; the diligent appropriator did not acquire the right to
pollute. 9
The appropriation doctrine was popular because it invited rapid de-
velopment and use of western surface supplies, but new appropriations
could not be limited unless a senior interest sought an injunction. The
senior appropriator had to prove his priority, the likelihood of imminent
and irreparable damage to his use by defendant's proposed diversion, and
that an action for damages would be inadequate. Such evidence would
normally be expensive and difficult to obtain. Without any effective method
of matching new appropriations against available supplies, the doctrine
theoretically required curtailments in inverse order of priority, terminating
all junior uses to permit the senior use to obtain a full supply. But rigid
application of the doctrine would produce unacceptable results if socially
essential junior uses could thus be terminated. Since the priorities of
competing users had rarely been determined, and scientific information
was not readily available to measure available supplies and predict the
13. 1 WIEL, supra note 9, §§ 112, 117, 118. See generally, HUTCHINS, WATER RIGHTS
LAWS IN THE NINETEEN WESTERN STATES (1971); DEWSNUP & JENSEN, A SUMMARY-
DIGEST OF STATE WATER LAWS 243-257 (1973) (Nat'l Water Comm'n). If Hawaii is classed
as a "western state," its traditional water law does not recognize the prior appropriate doctrine.
14. 2 WIEL, supra note 9, 970-1094; Clark, Ground Water Legislation in the Light of Experience
in the Western States, 22 MONT. LAW. REV. 42 (1960); Trelease, Legal Solutions to Groundwater
Problems-A General Overview, II PAC. L. J. 863 (1980).
15. 1 WIEL, supra note 9, § 207. Some of the better recent articles on Indian water rights are:
Hundley, The "Winters" Decision and Indian Water Rights: A Mystery Reexamined, 13 W. HIST.
Q. 17 (1982); Shrago, Emerging Indian Water Rights: An Analysis of Recent Judicial and Legislative
Developments, 26 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST., 1105 (1980); Note, Indian Claims to Ground-
water: Reserved Rights or Beneficial Interest, 33 STAN. L. REV. 103 (1980).
16. 1 WIEL, supra note 9, § 68. The municipal "pueblo" right is recognized judicially in Cal-
ifornia, City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, 14 Cal. 3d 199, 537 P.2d 1250, 123 Cal.
Rptr. 1 (1975); Gleason, Los Angeles v. San Fernando: Ground Water Management in the Grand
Tradition, 4 HAST. CONST. L.Q. 703 (1977); and in New Mexico, Cartwright v. Public Service
Co. of New Mexico, 66 N.M. 64, 343 P.2d 654 (1958), and by statute in Texas. TEX. WATER
CODE ANN. § 11.028 (Vernon Supp. 1982).
17. 1 WIEL, supra note 9, §§ 152-156. Among numerous interesting articles on this area of water
rights law, Meyers, Federal Groundwater Rights: A Note on Cappaert v. United States, 13 LAND
& WATER L. REV. 377 (1978), stands out as a useful memorandum.
18. I. WIEL, supra note 9, note to §53, at 61.
19. C. MEYERS, supra note 5, at 22-23.
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effects of new diversions and depletions, the risks inherent in the doctrine
were difficult to assess.
As long as the principal water use was gold and silver mining, such
defects were of small concern. Those mining uses were temporary; when
the mine played out, the miner moved on with no thought of long-term
consequences. As irrigated agriculture developed in the post-Civil War
West,20 water use changed from privately-financed, temporary, mainly
non-consumptive mining uses to publicly-financed, permanent, heavily
depleting irrigation projects. 2 Water rights became permanent appurte-
nances to irrigated land.22
Once the widely fluctuating supply furnished by most western streams
was fully committed, needs began to be met from stored groundwater.
The landowner's right to extract and use such water followed from his
fee simple title under the common law maxim, Cujus est solum ejus est
usque ad caelum et ad inferos.23 Changes in points of diversion or in the
method, place or purpose of use were allowed by the courts under another
ancient maxim, sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas.24 A change would
be allowed if it did not injure others. But without full adjudication of
water rights no one precisely knew who held senior or junior rights, the
location of points of diversion, or the nature of existing uses. Without
reliable hydrological information, no one could be certain whether he
would be injured by a change or by a new appropriation. The judicial
system, based upon the adversary procedures of the common law, could
not protect existing users who were not parties to a legal action.25
Over the long run, the West's expanding population and economy
developed and used water resources for all kinds of purposes, but the
most important uses often developed more slowly. If such uses were
20. The significant federal statutes were the Homestead Act of 1862, 12 Stat. 392; the Pacific
Railway Acts, 12 Stat. 489 (1862); the Act of July 26, 1866, ch. 262, §9, 14 Stat. 251, 253; the
Act of July 9, 1870, ch. 235, § 17, 16 Stat. 217,218; the Act of March 3, 1877, ch. 107, 19 Stat.
377; and the Reclamation Act of 1902, 32 Stat. 388.
21. Sax, Federal Reclamation Law, in 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 111 (R. Clark ed.
1967); E. HEADY, H. MADSEN, K. NICOL, & S. HARGROVE, AGRICULTURAL WATER
DEMANDS (1971) (Nat'l Water Comm'n Study); Burness, Cummings, Gorman & Lansford, United
States Reclamation Policy and Indian Water Rights, 20 NAT. RES. J. 807 (1980); Howe, New
Procedures for the Evaluation of Federal Water Projects, I SW. REV. OF MGMT. AND ECON.
115 (1981).
22. To improve free transferability of water rights, Frederick, supra note 6, at 31-32, recommends
abrogation of the appurtenance of an irrigation right to the irrigated tract.
23. 2 WIEL, supra note 9, § 1039; Moses, Basic Groundwater Problems, 14 ROCKY MTN.
MIN. L. INST. 501 (1968).
24. Maeris v. Bicknell, 7 Cal. 261 (1857); Kidd v. Laird, 15 Cal. 161, 180-81 (1860); 1 WIEL,
supra note 9, § 498.
25. 1 WIEL, supra note 9, §§ 625-627. "The rights of such persons will not, of course, be
injuriously affected by the decree in this cause, and non constat but that they may yet intervene for
their own protection. Gutierres v. Albuquerque Land and Irrigation Co., 188 U.S. 545, 557
(1903).
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governed by prior appropriation requirements, they would be the most
junior rights and the most in danger of curtailment by an unexpected
insufficiency. Essential domestic and municipal uses could not be held in
such jeopardy; nor could they be required to incur the high cost of ac-
quiring a senior priority by purchase or condemnation.
Despite a constitutional mandate in many western states, the prior
appropriation doctrine had exhausted its usefulness by the end of the 19th
century, when surface supplies in most areas were fully appropriated.
Before the doctrine precipitated a curtailment crisis, it was superseded
by a system of administrative control. In the early years of the present
century, Elwood Mead and Clarence T. Johnston in Wyoming developed
an administrative system to provide continuous attention to water re-
sources beyond the capabilities of the courts.2 6 After the Wyoming "water
code" was enacted in 1907, it was widely emulated in prior appropriation
states. Now all states rely in varying degrees on a state office to achieve
an acceptable allocation of water to meet both existing and future needs. 27
Creation of the "water bureaucracies" based on executive rather than
judicial authority halted the growth of the court-created prior appropriation
doctrine. Determination of relative priorities was obviously a judicial
function requiring the evidentiary adjudication of rights beyond the ad-
ministrative authority of the State Engineer. The statutes governing new
appropriations and transfers therefore required the Engineer to assume
parity among all valid and existing rights, both "vested" and permitted, 28
because most streams were assumed to be fully appropriated, and forced
curtailment of necessary junior uses could not be risked. The key concept
shifted from "priority" to "impairment." Universal non-impairment was
intended to protect all existing users equally against the possibility of
curtailment compelled by the prior appropriation doctrine. In addition,
many states denied the prior appropriation doctrine by adopting "pref-
erence" laws, requiring industrial uses to abate regardless of priority to
prevent curtailment of supplies for domestic and municipal uses. 29 In New
26. 2 WIEL, supra note 9, §§ 1184, 1428; 1 WIEL, supra note 9, § 124. That establishment of
state administrative offices began within five years after enactment of the federal reclamation law
was not coincidental. State administrators were an equipoise in the age of great federal reclamation
projects.
27. C. MEYERS, supra note 5, at 13. See CLYDE & JENSEN, ADMINISTRATIVE ALLO-
CATION OF WATER (1971) (Nat'l Water Comm. Legal Study No. 3). Montana and Colorado rely
on adjudication procedures more than administrative control. DEWSNUP & JENSEN, supra note
13, at 155-173, 449-460.
28. N.M. Stat. Ann. §72-5-24 (1978). Existing rights entitled to protection under the non-
impairment policy possibly include federal, Indian, and municipal pueblo rights not based on ben-
eficial use. See Cartwright v. Public Service Co. of New Mexico, 66 N.M 64, 80-85, 343 P.2d
654, 665-669 (1958).
29. COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 6; IDAHO CONST. art. XV, § 3; NEB. CONST. art. XV § 6;
ALASKA STAT. §§46.15.090,.150 (1977); TEX. WATER CODE ANN. §§ 1'1.024, 11.028, 11.123
(Vernon Supp. 1982); UTAH CODE ANN. H873-3-21, 73-3-8 (1980); WYO. STAT. § 41-3-102
(Vol. 23
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Mexico's San Juan Basin extensive dewatering of mineral-bearing for-
mations led the legislature to find in 1980 that "existing principles of
prior appropriation. . .may cause severe economic hardship and impact
to persons engaged in mineral production .... "30 Thus, the doctrine
created by miners first on the scene proved inadequate to their needs a
century later when other miners were the most recent arrivals.
Creation of a governing administrative office charged with examining
closely all transfers of water rights impeded creation of active and open
markets for water rights. "Impairment" was not precisely defined in the
statutes that created the apparatus to prevent it. Although the statutes
spoke of impairing "rights," rather than a physical supply, a right to take
and use water was obviously impaired by preemption of the supply by
those who had no legal right to take it. Hence, the new rule of non-
impairment required strict administrative control of water supplies. In
practice, the administrators rigidly prohibited increased use; even senior
appropriators were required to prove that their transfer of rights would
not "impair" the most junior rights on the system. The courts' uncertain
response to the new system caused additional confusion. 3 The states paid
insufficient attention to both supply (scientific studies) and demand (ad-
judication of rights); public funds went into storage and delivery projects
which made markets unnecessary. In many instances, purchase and re-
(1977). Irrigation is usually ranked in preference behind domestic use. WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 90.03.040 (1962), 8.12.030, 35.92.010 (1961). Usually, low-preference senior rights must be
compensated if their priority is taken for a high-preference use. See Alaska, Colorado, Idaho,
Nebraska, Washington, and Wyoming statutes cited above. Otherwise, abatement of a senior, low-
preference right is uncompensated as an exercise of the state's police power to protect the health
and safety of the community. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.028 (Vernon Supp. 1982); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 73-3-21 (1980).
30. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-12A-2(A)(3) (1978).
31. In the same year, the New Mexico Supreme Court, in Templeton v. Pecos Valley Artesian
Conservancy Dist., 65 N.M. 59, 332 P.2d 465 (1958), permitted a senior surface right to drill wells
to obtain a supplementary supply from the alluvial fill of the Pecos River, thus encroaching on the
groundwater available for well-established junior pumpers, but In Re Hobson, 64 N.M. 462, 330
P.2d 547 (1958), denied a requested change in location of a junior well on the grounds that the same
basin was over-appropriated, while Application of Brown, 65 N.M. 74, 332 P.2d 475 (1958),
permitted such a change despite a proven drop in the groundwater level. In Kelly v. Carlsbad
Irrigation Dist., 71 N.M. 464, 379 P.2d 763 (1963), 76 N.M. 466, 415 P.2d 849 (1966), the Court
held that any transfer affecting the Roswell Artesian Basin must be treated as a new appropriation.
Comment, The Rise and Fall of New Mexico's Templeton Doctrine, 6 NAT. RES. J. 325 (1966).
Flint, Groundwater Law and Administration: A New Mexico Viewpoint, 14 ROCKY MTN MIN. L.
INST. 545, 557 (1968), explains the confused decisions as expedients designed to avoid "priority
calls" to cut off junior appropriators: "Some would argue that it would have been inequitable to
close down the surface-water diversions of an appropriator with a 1910 priority for the benefit of a
surface-water user with a priority of 1890, and at the same time permit groundwater appropriators
in the vicinity to continue pumping their wells despite the fact that thousands of acres of groundwater
uses were developed as late as the 1930's. On the other hand, it would be perhaps equally unreasonable
to close down as much as 15,000 to 20,000 acres of groundwater irrigation to restore the flow of
surface water to the extent that would permit the irrigation of a 160-acre downstream farm. At the
same time, it is patently unfair, if not unlawful under the doctrine of prior appropriation, to subject
the 1890 water right to regular water shortages."
January 19831
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tirement of irrigation rights were administratively required to permit nec-
essary municipal or industrial uses to develop.32 Such transactions were
clearly coerced. There was no "free market" where neither buyer nor
seller was under compulsion.
Whether a new or different diversion or use of water would "impair"
the water supply available to an existing use required the administrative
officer, like a gypsy fortuneteller, to foretell the future effect of the pro-
posed appropriation or change. The courts, following tort concepts, would
have demanded proof of proximate cause and actual loss, or, on equitable
grounds, would have refused injunctions to prevent impairment without
proof of grave and irreparable harm.33 Administrative discretion, however,
was able to impose restrictions on water use without precise measurements
of available supplies or existing demands, and without verifiable scientific
forecasts of future interference with water supplies already allocated.34
The engineers and hydrologists resolved all doubts in favor of im-
pairment and relied on general notions of a critical water shortage to win
political acceptance of their authority. Impairment was administratively
predicated on assumed hydrological relationships of surface and ground-
water,35 ignoring the complete absence of proof that any existing right
would in fact be deprived of its supply.36 Pumping anywhere within a
basin would eventually reduce the flow of streams; since water rights are
legally deemed to be permanent and timeless, the time lag was admin-
istratively ignored and the calculated ultimate effect on streamflow was
accepted as an actual, immediate effect.37 New uses could only be sub-
stituted for old uses, with no increase in calculated depletion of supply.
Thus, irrigation rights had to be retired to permit municipal and industrial
rights to develop.38 Green farm land was thereby sacrificed for urban
growth and industrial development.
32. City of Albuquerque v. Reynolds, 71 N.M. 428, 379 P.2d 73 (1962).
33. Maestas v. Elephant Butte Irrigation Dist., No. 78-138B (D.N.M. May 11, 1979).
34. Due process requirements were satisfied by administrative hearings in which applicants could
theoretically prove non-impairment, or protestants could prove impairment, but the necessary evi-
dence was expensive and difficult to obtain, and the administrative view usually prevailed. Compare
Heine v. Reynolds, 69 N.M. 398, 401, 367 P.2d 708 (1962), with City of Roswell v. Berry, 80
N.M. 110, 452 P.2d 179 (1969).
35. The scientific basis for administrative control was C. V. Theis' equation. Theis, The Signif-
icance and Nature of the Cone of Depression in Ground-Water Bodies, 33 ECONOMIC GEOLOGY
No. 8 (1938); The Source of Water Derived From Wells, 10 CIVIL ENGINEERING No. 5 (1940);
The Effect of a Well on the Flow of a Nearby Stream, 22 TRANSACTIONS, AMERICAN GEO-
PHYSICAL UNION, 734 (1941).
36. Hall v. Kuiper, 181 Colo. 130, 510 P.2d 329, 330-1 (1973).
37. The recent Colorado cases have measured the time lag, rather than ignoring it. District 10
Water Users Ass'n v. Barnett, 198 Colo. 291, 599 P.2d 894, 896 (1979). Scheduled depletion of
non-recharging reservoirs has also recognized their estimated useful life. Mathers v. Texaco, Inc.,
77 N.M. 239, 421 P.2d 771 (1966).
38. Under Colorado's 1969 Water Rights Determination and Administration Act Colo. Rev. Stat.
1973 § 37-92-201 such requirements may be part of a "plan for augmentation," Kelly Ranch v.
Southeastern Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., 191 Colo, 65, 550 P.2d 297 (1976).
[Vol. 23
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The rigid administrative prohibition of necessary uses without a con-
vincing scientific basis inevitably led to adjustments in the non-impair-
ment requirement. First, the courts' interpretation and application of the
standard in actual conflicts produced more realistic results than the ad-
ministrators' prohibitions based on general, unverifiable predictions. Sec-
ond, the legislatures in many states recognized that non-impairment requires
some leeway; only "unreasonable" impairment should be prohibited.
In early well interference cases -the courts both over-protected and
under-protected senior rights. New appropriators were often enjoined
from interfering to any extent with existing supplies, in effect conferring
a vested interest in "historical" or pristine groundwater levels.39 Yet,
where groundwater was subducted by mine dewatering, the courts denied
the aggrieved senior appropriator any remedy.4° Dewatering was treated
as a permissible incident of land ownership under the common law prin-
ciple (or its American variants) that an owner of land is entitled, abso-
lutely, to use its groundwater. Property rights precluded recovery of damages
under tort doctrines of nuisance or negligence.
4
'
Damages for proven well interference were sometimes determined on
an inverse condemnation theory (the difference in market value of the
land before and after the interference); sometimes, particularly where
ample groundwater was available, damages were determined according
to the value of lost crops or the increased cost of obtaining an adequate
39. Forbell v. City of New York, 164 N.Y. 522, 58 N.E. 644 (1900); Duckworth v. Watsonville
Water & Light Co., 150 Cal. 520, 89 P. 338 (1907); Pima Farms Co. v. Proctor, 30 Ariz. 96, 245
P. 369 (1926); Noh v. Stoner, 53 Idaho 651, 26 P.2d 1112 (1933); Joseph W. Bowles Reservoir Co.
v. Bennett, 92 Colo. 16, 18 P.2d 313 (1932); Faden v. Hubbell, 93 Colo. 358, 28 P.2d 247 (1933);
Justesen v. Olsen, 86 Utah 158, 40 P.2d 802 (1935); Canada v. City of Shawnee, 179 Okla. 53, 64
P.2d 694 (1937); Hanson v. Salt Lake City, 105 Utah 404, 205 P.2d 255 (1949); Lodi v. East Bay
Municipal Utility District, 7 Cal. 2d 316, 60 P.2d 439 (1939); Trussell v. City of San Diego, 172
Cal. App. 2d 593, 343 P.2d 65 (Cal. Dist. Crt. App., 1959). Injunctive relief was based on the
continuing nature of the wrong. 2 HUTCHINS, supra note 13, at 225-245.
40. Pumping to the point of inducing subsidence of nearby property may also be a privilege of
ownership in some states. Note, Subsidence: An Emerging Area of the Law, 22 ARIZ. L. REV. 891
(1980); Note, Sinking Fortunes: Texas Remedies For Victims of Land Subsidence, 20 NAT. RES. J.
375 (1980); Teutsch, Controls and Remedies For Ground Water-Caused Land Subsidence, 16 HOUS.
L. REV. 283 (1979).
41. Silver King Consolidated Mining Co. v. Sutton, 85 Utah 297, 39 P.2d 682 (1934); N.M.
Long & Co. v. Cannon-Papanikolos Constr. Co., 9 Utah 2d 307, 343 P.2d 1100 (1959); Evans v.
City of Seattle, 182 Wash. 450, 47 P.2d 984 (1935); Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co. v. Wilkes,
231 Ala. 511, 165 So. 764, 770 (1936), 236 Ala. 173, 181 So. 276 (1938); Sycamore Coal Co. v.
Stanley, 292 Ky. 168, 166 S.W.2d 293 (1942); Finley v. Teeter Stone, Inc., 251 Md. 428, 248 A.2d
106 (1968); Bayer v. Nello L. Teer Co., 256 N.C. 509, 124 S.E.2d 552 (1962); Jarvis v. State Land
Dep't, 106 Ariz. 506, 479 P.2d 169 (1970). However, in California the "correlative rights" principle
required the dewaterer to provide a substitute supply. Eckel v. Springfield Tunnel & Dev. Co., 87
Cal. App. 617, 262 P. 425 (Cal. Dist. Crt. App., 1927). See Annot., 55 A.L.R. 1385, 1408-1412,
1425-1427, 1444-1451 (1928) (Subterranean and Percolating Waters). In New Mexico, recovery
of damages based on a nuisance theory was undoubtedly barred by the Mine Dewatering Act, 1980
N.M. Laws 599, which authorized dewatering as neither an appropriation nor a waste. N.M. Stat.
Ann. § 72-12A-I I(B) (1978) denies injunctive relief but does not deny damages; under ordinary
nuisance principles, dewatering authorized by statute could not be a nuisance.
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supply, including increased electricity expense .42 Tevis v. McCrary4 3 sus-
tained a jury's award, which was probably based on the cost of enlarging
and deepening the affected well. In City of Enid v. Crow,44 the plaintiff,
whose domestic supply had been reduced from "three faucets to one
faucet," recovered the value of that loss ($3,811.41) on an inverse con-
demnation theory. In Tucksinger v. Loup River Public Power Dist.45 the
court fixed damages for impairment of subirrigation by defendant's tail-
race at the value of crops that could have been grown on the irrigated
land and any loss in land value.
The courts were able to modify the non-impairment rule to foster
maximum use of water resources. In surface water cases, a prior appro-
priator was not permitted, by using inefficient methods of diversion, to
command the entire flow of the stream. 46 Surface flows varied; diminu-
tions attributable to the requirements of existing rights were inescapable.
In the case of groundwater reservoirs, the courts refused to allow the first
pumper to prevent later pumpers from lowering the water level below
the depth of his well. Such circumstances developed the notion of a
permissible burden judicially imposed on a senior right to permit expanded
or "optimum" use of the resource. In the language of the New Mexico
Supreme Court, the burden was the inevitable result of "beneficial use
by the public." 47
Yet, in the absence of statutory provisions authorizing judicial flexibility
in applying the strict non-impairment rule, the courts were reluctant to
use a de minimis concept in granting relief, treating some junior en-
croachments as a technical trespass. 48 In Heine v. Reynolds,49 the court
rejected the contention that "impair" should be construed to mean "sub-
stantially impair" on the basis of reasonableness and an implied exclusion
of de minimis impairments. ". . . [T]he question of impairment of ex-
isting rights is a matter which must generally depend upon each appli-
42. Note, Ground Water Preferences in Nebraska, 59 NEB. L. REV. 831 (1980). See also Annot.,
35 A.L.R. 1222 (1925), Annot., 55 A.L.R. 1385, 1482 (1925); 2 HUTCHINS, supra note 13, at
216-245.
43. 75 N.M. 165, 402 P.2d 150 (1965).
44. 316 P.2d 834 (Okla. 1957).
45. 140 Neb. 179, 299 N.W. 549 (1941).
46. Natoma Water & Mining Co. v. Hancock, 101 Cal. 42, 35 Pac. 334, 337 (1894); Schodde
v. Twin Falls Land & Water Co., 161 Fed. 43 (9th Cir. 1908) (Idaho), aff'd 224 U.S. 107 (1912);
Warner Valley Stock Co. v. Lynch, 215 Or. 523, 336 P.2d 884 (1959); State ex rel. Crowley v.
Dist. Ct., 108 Mont. 89, 88 P.2d 23 (1939).
47. Mathers v. Texaco, Inc., 77 N.M. 239, 246, 421 P.2d 771, 776 (1966).
48. Professor Corker has suggested that, "Relief should not be granted where the amount of
damages is less than the cost of administering the award." In an action to enjoin well interference,
however, he suggested that, "if water supply is adequate, a junior appropriator's water use will not
be enjoined solely because of interference with pump lift or artesian pressure." CORKER, supra
note 3, at 183.
49. 69 N.M. 398, 401, 367 P.2d 708 (1962).
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cation, and to attempt to define the same would lead to severe
complications." 50 That decision was followed in Duran v. Reynolds,"
but was later criticized in Langenegger v. Carlsbad Irrigation District52
where supplementary irrigation wells were allowed in an aquifer that was
a source of the Pecos River, despite recognition that "some changes in
the waters of the aquifer and also of the river" would result. The court
concluded that "change alone is not to be equated with impairment of
the rights of others."
In City of Roswell v. Berry,53 the State Engineer approved the City's
proposed new well field because the expected lowering of the water level
in the Roswell Artesian Basin would be offset by retirement of 1500 acre
feet of other water rights in the Basin. He also determined that the
expected lowering of the water level in a protester's wells would have a
"negligible effect" on water quality. On appeal, the court rejected the
protester's argument that any degradation, however negligible, consti-
tuted an impairment, holding that the "finding of 'negligible effect' does
not require a determination, as a matter of law, that the chemical quality
of the water in Berry's artesian wells was impaired by a lowering of the
water level . . . by less than 0.16 feet." '54
In City of Roswell v. Reynolds,55 the court cited Mathers v. Texaco,
Inc.,5 6 and Application of Brown57 in support of its holding that "the
lowering of the water table does not necessarily constitute an impairment
of the water rights of adjoining appropriators," but it cautioned that "it
does not follow that the lowering of the water table may never in itself
constitute an impairment of existing rights." 5 8 The court refused to con-
sider waivers by owners of nearby wells, the City's senior priority, or its
offer to reduce its water rights by 25% as grounds for overturning the
conditions fixed by the State Engineer for approval of the City's appli-
cation to move certain wells in the Roswell Underground Water Basin.
In Brown, the protester had claimed impairment because the water level
50. Id. at 402, 367 P.2d at 711. In Colorado, where surface streams and "tributary" groundwater
are legally distinguished from "designated groundwater," which is not sufficiently hydraulically
connected to a stream or its alluvium, the courts have held that the tributary character of "water
taking over a century to reach the stream . . . is de minimis and that this is not a part of the surface
stream as contemplated by our Constitution." Kuiper v. Lundvall, 187 Colo. 40, 529 P.2d 1328,
1331 (1974), appeal dismissed, 421 U.S. 996 (1975). The Court noted: "By the time the rivers are
affected by the pumping from this basin, we have little doubt but what scientific progress will have
solved many of the problems caused by the failure of this water to reach the stream."
51. 75 N.M. 497, 406 P.2d 817 (1965).
52. 82 N.M. 416, 421, 483 P.2d 297, 302 (1971).
53. 80 N.M. 110, 452 P.2d 179 (1969).
54. Id. at 116, 452 P.2d at 185.
55. 86 N.M. 249, 522 P.2d 796 (1974).
56. 77 N.M. 239, 421 P.2d 771 (1966).
57. 65 N.M. 74, 332 P.2d 475 (1958).
58. 86 N.M. 249, 253, 522 P.2d 796, 800.
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in his well would be reduced 3.9 feet, while in Mathers the court held
that lower water levels and increased pumping costs were "inevitable
results of the beneficial use by the public" of the waters of a non-re-
chargeable basin to which the State Engineer had assigned a 40-year life,
allowing the lowest one-third for domestic uses.59
The Brown, Mathers, and Roswell decisions established that the holder
of a New Mexico groundwater right has no vested interest in pristine
water levels, or even in a stable water table, at least within a declared
groundwater basin that by definition is subject to depletion by existing
appropriators. In the only New Mexico case of well interference outside
a declared basin, the federal court denied an injunction against the drilling
of wells where plaintiffs' proof showed only a "loss of efficiency" in
their existing wells and a slight increase in salinity. The court held that
adverse effects on well performance did not constitute an impairment of
water rights and retained jurisdiction to reconsider the issue if the degree
of interference with plaintiffs' wells reached the level of "water right
impairment."6 o
By holding that a groundwater right is not "necessarily" impaired by
a drop in water levels, just as a surface water right is not impaired by
changes in the natural flow of a stream, the New Mexico courts have
held, in effect, that a water right does not guarantee the continuous use
of an existing method of diversion. Since a water right is merely an
"usufructuary estate" entitling the owner to capture, take, and use water
for a beneficial purpose, 6' the means of capture and diversion must be
efficient and non-wasteful; they may have to be changed to meet different
conditions of the supply.62
In many western states, as groundwater has become more widely used
and the practical consequences of the rigid protection of senior claims
has become more clearly understood, "impairment" has been defined by
statute as an "unreasonable" lowering of the water or pumping level. 63
The "reasonableness" of such a decline may be decided strictly on eco-
nomic grounds, or according to hydrological estimates of the level of
pumping required to use the resource efficiently. Some states, like Mis-
59. 77 N.M. 239, 246, 421 P.2d 771, 776.
60. Mestas v. Elephant Butte Irrigation Dist., No. 78-138B (D.N.M. May 11, 1979), as discussed
in Comment, Protection of the Means of Groundwater Diversion, 20 NAT. RES. J. 625, 646-648
(1980).
61. Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443, 446-47 (1882).
62. See cases cited supra, note 46.
63. ALASKA STAT. §46.15.050 (1977); COLO. REV. STAT. §§37-90-102, -107(3) and (5)
(1973), -11 l(1)(b); IDAHO CODE § 42-226, -237(a)(g) (Supp. 1980); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-
711 (Supp. 1981); MO. REV. CODES ANN. §85-2-401 (1979); MONT. CODE ANN. §85-2-
401(1), -508, -511 (1981); NEV. REV. STAT. §534.110(4), (5), (7) (1979); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 537.525(7), (8), .620(3), .685(2) (1979); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 90.44.070 (1962); WYO.
STAT. § 41-3-933 (1977).
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souri, have applied an economic criterion in denying a senior appropriator
the right to stop junior pumping if he could "reasonably exercise" his
water rights under the changed conditions. Under the Colorado statute,
"reasonable" pumping levels, within "reasonable economic limits of
withdrawal and use," are protected, but not the "historic water levels"
necessary to preserve every senior's original means of extraction. 64 Wy-
oming, like Montana, has followed the resource management approach
by providing that water levels will not be maintained above the level
required for "maximum beneficial use" of groundwater. Such statutes
require senior appropriators to bear the costs of adapting their methods
of diversion-the size and depth of wells and pumps-to declining
groundwater levels, to the point where full development and use of the
resource will be possible. The cost of further measures would presumably
be attributable to pumping by junior appropriators.
Where a statute permitting some degree of infringement of senior rights
is unavailable, many courts have found unflinching application of the
priority doctrine impossible in practice; therefore, they have used a variety
of practical remedies to achieve a reasonable accommodation among
conflicting uses and thus permitted desirable junior uses to begin or
continue. Even where an injunction was held to be proper, the order was
usually qualified to permit the junior use to continue with practical pro-
tection for the senior right. However, the cost fell on the junior user
predominantly, if not solely.
Most of the decisions are in California. In Montecito Valley Water Co.
v. City of Santa Barbara61 the city had diverted nearly one-third of the
flow of a creek covered by a senior water right. The court awarded
damages for water previously taken and directed that an injunction be
issued against the illegal diversion "if any and all other forms of relief
should be found inadequate," suggesting "restoration of the given amount
of water, or in some other manner which shall meet in equity." The ruling
in Eckel v. Springfield Tunnel & Development Co.66 similarly authorized
restoration of "an equal quantity of water of like quality" as an acceptable
condition of an injunction against the infringing junior use. In City of
Lodi v. East Bay Municipal Utility District67 the California Supreme Court
directed the trial court to consider possible "physical solutions" to the
impairment of the city's senior rights by the district's upstream storage,
which blocked flood flows that had maintained the groundwater level for
the city's wells, suggesting that the district supply the city's requirements
by pipeline from surface storage, with all expenses to be borne by the
64. Fundingsland v. Colorado Ground Water Comm'n, 171 Colo. 487, 468 P.2d 835, 839 (1970).
65. 144 Cal. 578, 77 Pac. 1113 (1904).
66. 87 Cal. App. 617, 262 P.425 (Cal. Dist. Crt. App., 1927).
67. 7 Cal. 2d 316, 60 P.2d 439 (1936).
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district as junior appropriator. Although stating that the "prior appropri-
ator . . . cannot be compelled to incur any material expense in order to
accommodate the subsequent appropriator," the court held that the senior
interest could be "required to make minor changes in its method of
appropriation" to avoid waste of the resource and directed the trial court
to define a water level to which the city would be required to deepen its
wells, with the district required to maintain the water level above that
depth or to provide a substitute supply. Similarly, in Rancho Santa Mar-
garita v. Vail65 the court directed the trial court to try to find a "physical
solution" to reductions in stream flow caused by upstream riparian use,
which lowered water levels in the river valley and interfered with plain-
tiff's shallow stock wells. The court held that "the lower owner cannot
be expected or required to endure an unreasonable inconvenience or to
incur an unreasonable expense in order to make more water available for
the use of the upper riparian," and that the upper user must bear "a fair
proportion of the expense of providing an alternative supply for the down-
stream ranch or face an injunction." In Gerlach Livestock Co. v. United
States,69 the federal courts interpreted California law as placing on the
junior user the full expense of the "physical solution" to "preserve ex-
isting prior rights."
However, in MacArtor v. Graylyn Crest III Swim Club, Inc., 70 the
Delaware court conditioned an injunction on the defendant's paying one-
half the cost of deepening plaintiff's shallow well, or one-half the expense
of transporting water from defendant's well to the swimming pool. Dam-
ages were recovered (for the cost of a pump, cement, and 10 years'
electricity) for a stock well dried up by a junior appropriation in Dep't
of Natural Resources v. Crumpled Horn,7' but the court denied damages
for replacement of a pump that was more than 30 years old because
"wells of this type are depreciated out by this time." 72
In Colorado, the 1961 decision in Colorado Springs v. Bender73 required
senior appropriators to bear the cost of modifying their means of diversion
to adapt to declining water levels as long as "water still can be econom-
ically extracted when the total economic pattern of the particular desig-
68. 11 Cal. 2d 501, 81 P.2d 533, 562-63 (1938).
69. 76 F. Supp. 87, 95 (Ct. Cl. 1948), aff'd 339 U.S. 725, 752-755 (1950).
70. 41 Del. Ch. 26, 187 A.2d 417 (1963).
71. Interlocutory Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Dep't Natural Resources & Conser-
vation v. Crumpled Horn, No. 7076 (Mont. 9th Jud. Dist. May 16, 1978) (Discussed in Grant,
supra note 2, at 10-15).
72. Grant, supra note 2, at 13.
73. 148 Colo. 458, 366 P.2d 552 (1961); COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-102(2)(b) (1973). Carlson,
Has the Doctrine of Appropriation Outlived Its Usefulness, 19 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 529,
534-547 (1974); Hannay, Recent Developments In Colorado Groundwater Law, 58 DEN. L. J. 801,
820 (1981).
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nated groundwater basin is considered." 74 The "economic reach" of the
senior appropriator, which marked the limit of his duty to improve his
extraction facilities under the court's opinion, is shorter for small users
than for larger users. Domestic and stock wells would thus have a pre-
ferred claim to indemnity because their water is of relatively low value,
compared to large municipal, agricultural, or industrial uses.75 The same
comparison was involved in State v. Michels Pipeline Construction, Inc.7 6
on the basis of § 858A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. The court
said: "Later users with superior economic resources should not be allowed
to impose costs upon smaller water users that are beyond their economic
capacity."
In Wyoming, a preference for "adequate" domestic and stock wells is
established by statute,7 7 while Nevada directed its State Engineer to pro-
hibit new domestic wells if water could be furnished by a municipal
system.78 Interference with domestic or stock wells might entail payment
of full indemnity under a statute similar to the Oregon statute which
prohibits "undue interference" with existing wells,7 9 while interference
with wells owned by interests with greater "reach" might not require
indemnity, particularly if such wells were not sufficiently large or deep
to achieve maximum utilization of the resource.
Judicial and legislative recognition that non-impairment cannot be ab-
solute, that some infringements or burdens upon senior rights are nec-
essary or permissible, led naturally to the idea that new uses may be
initiated if established uses are indemnified. In Utah, a 1933 statute
granted "the right of replacement," at the "sole cost and expense of the
applicant" and subject to the State Engineer's approval, to any junior
appropriator who lowered the quantity or quality of groundwater.80
Although Current Creek Irrigation Co. v. Andrews8 imposed the entire
increased cost of extraction on the junior pumper, the Utah Supreme
Court in Wayman v. Murray City Corp.82 held that the statute required
"an analysis of the total situation. . . . All users are required where
necessary to employ reasonable and efficient means in taking their own
74. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-111 (1)(a) (1973).
75. Comment, South Dakota Ground Water and the Artesian Pressure: Is the Use of Water For
Domestic Purposes Still the Highest Use?, 24 S.D. L. REV. 772 (1979).
76. 63 Wis.2d 278, 217 N.W.2d 339 (1974).
77. WYO. STAT. §41-3-911 (1977).
78. NEV. REV. STAT. § 534.120(2), (3)(a) (1979).
79. OR. REV. STAT. § 537.620(3), .735(3)(c) (1979); Prather v. Eisenmann, 200 Neb. 1, 261
N.W.2d 766 (1978).
80. UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3-23 (1980). The statute embodied the decisions in Salt Lake City
v. Gardner, 39 Utah 30, 114 P. 147 (1911), Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. Shurtliff, 56 Utah
196, 189 P. 587 (1919), and U.S. v. Caldwell, 64 Utah 490, 231 P. 434 (1924).
81. 9 Utah 2d 324, 344 P.2d 528 (1959).
82. 23 Utah 2d 97, 458 P.2d 861, 865 (1969).
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waters in relation to others to the end that wastage of water is avoided
and the greatest amount of available water is put to beneficial use." One
commentator has noted that the Utah statute increased the burdens on the
junior appropriator above the risk imposed by the prior appropriation
doctrine-"that seniors will take all the available water, leaving none for
him"-requiring payment of indemnity "in tribute" to the seniors.8 3 The
Wayman decision indicates that senior interests will be required to bear
at least some of the increased costs of extraction.
After the Colorado Supreme Court announced the goal of "maximum
utilization" in Fellhauer v. People,84 the legislature incorporated the same
objective in the 1969 Water Rights Determination and Administration
Act. 85 The court's opinion recognized that maximum utilization of ground-
water resources would collide with the "vested rights" of prior appro-
priators of hydraulically connected surface streams.86 The legislature's
solution was to approve junior groundwater diversions that had not in
fact deprived senior rights of water and to authorize new appropriations
under a "plan for augmentation. "' Such a plan might propose retirement
of irrigation rights or any expedient that prevents injury to senior rights. 8
In 1980, Arizona adopted a dewatering statute that requires a permit
for necessary mine dewatering, subject to providing the pumpage without
charge to those adversely affected.89 Presumably, all other costs must be
borne by the affected senior interest. Wyoming9" and Idaho9 have also
adopted statutory methods of allowing junior appropriations of ground-
water.
Mine dewatering required to recover uranium deposits in the Westwater
Canyon member of the Morrison formation in New Mexico's San Juan
Basin presented a critical challenge to the impairment concept. Dewa-
tering a major aquifer might deprive existing users of their supply and
83. Widman, Groundwater-Hydrology and the Problem of Competing Well Owners, 14 ROCKY
MTN. MIN. L. INST. 523, 538 (1968).
84. 167 Colo. 320, 447 P.2d 986 (1968).
85. Codified at COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-102(l)(a) (Supp. 1980). Note, A Survey of Colorado
Water Law, 47 DEN. L. J. 226, 296-308, 331-39 (1970).
86. 167 Colo. 320, 447 P.2d 986, 994.
87. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-501(1) (1973); COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-301(2) (Supp.
1980).
88. Kelly Ranch v. Southeastern Colo. Water Conserv. Dist., 191 Colo. 65, 550 P.2d 297, 299-
301, 304 (1976); Cache La Poudre Water Users' Ass'n v. Glacier View Meadows, 191 Colo. 53,
550 P.2d 288, 289-91, 293 (1976); Hannay, supra note 73.
89. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-513 (Supp. 1981-1982). Johnson, The 1980Arizona Ground-
water Management Act and Trends In Western States Groundwater Administration and Management:
A Mineral Industry Perspective, 26 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 1031, 1082 (1980); Goodman,
Current Groundwater Law in Arizona, 1978 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 205; Higdon and Thompson, The 1980
Arizona Groundwater Management Code, 1980 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 621.
90. WYO. STAT. §41-3-106(a) (Supp. 1981).
91. IDAHO CODE § 42-228 (Supp. 1980).
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thus "impair" their rights; yet dewatering was wholly unregulated. The
State Engineer's jurisdiction was limited to an "appropriation" based on
beneficial use; displacement of water to obtain access to mineral ores
involved no beneficial use and hence was not an appropriation.92 The
administrative apparatus, therefore, could not protect the affected uses,
which included the full variety of industrial, municipal, agricultural,
domestic, and livestock.
Instead of leaving the problem for the courts, which might have with-
held any remedy under the precedents that mine dewatering is a privilege
of ownership, 93 the legislature passed a Mine Dewatering Act in 1980 to
place the entire problem in the State Engineer's hands. 94 A permit is
prospectively required for mine dewatering, which is defined as the di-
version and discharge of groundwater developed by mining activities,
including both wells and mine shafts. 95
To permit dewatering to occur despite impairment of existing rights
the act created a "right of replacement," but it is applicable to any
appropriation, not only to mine dewatering. 96 Senior rights affected by
dewatering are deprived of their right to seek an injunction against such
subduction of groundwater, 97 although the act disclaims any intent to
change constitutionally established priorities or to take them by eminent
domain.98
The New Mexico right of replacement is the most significant recent
innovation in western water law.99 Although similar to its antecedents in
Utah and Colorado, the New Mexico statute applies more broadly, to
surface as well as to groundwater appropriations. It thus amounts to the
statutory abandonment of the strict non-impairment policy in the interest
of fostering new water uses, if a "plan of replacement" (P/R) to avoid
or prevent impairment of existing rights, regardless of priority, receives
administrative approval. Although no P/R has yet been approved by the
92. In 1941 New Mexico enacted N.M. Stat. Ann. § 72-5-27 (1978), presumably to confirm the
decision in Hagerman Irrigation Co. v. East Grand Plains Drainage Dist., 25 N.M. 649, 187 P. 555
(1920), that artificial or developed water is private property, subject to beneficial use by the owner.
See Clark, Background and Trends in Water Salvage Law, 15 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 421,
434 (1969). That statute could divest the State Engineer of jurisdiction even where mine water was
beneficially used, as in an ion exchange process to recover marketable uranium salts.
93. See cases cited supra note 41.
94. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§72-12A-1 to -13 (1978). Comment, New Mexico's Mine DewateringAct:
The Search For Rehoboth, 20 NAT. RES. J. 653 (1980).
95. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 72-12A-3(B), -6 (1978). N.M. Stat. Ann. § 72-5-25 (1978) was not repealed
and may yet govern pre-enactment dewatering under N.M. Stat. Ann. § 72-12A-5B (1978).
96. N.M. Stat. Ann. §72-12A-4 (1978).
97. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 72-12A- 11 (B) (1978). The State Engineer may seek an injunction under
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 72-12A-11(A) (1978).
98. N.M. Stat. Ann. §72-12A-13 (1978).
99. See Corker, Inadequacy of the Present Law To Protect, Conserve and Develop Groundwater
Use, 25 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 23-1 (1979).
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State Engineer, the plans awaiting consideration provide various in-
demnities to alleviate the probable effects of mine dewatering. Mine
dewatering may render existing extraction equipment ineffective within
its normal useful life, thus demanding an extraordinary expenditure to
maintain a water supply. The indemnity provisions of the typical P/R,
following the damage awards for well interference and the "physical
solution" cases, obligate the applicant to pay such costs as increased
utility expense, deepening the well, replacing the pump, or enlarging its
capacity, and, in extremity, constructing a new well. The period of such
indemnities runs from a few years to almost indefinitely. The Act au-
thorizes delivery of mine water as a substitute supply, but such a physical
solution would rarely be practical.
Whether existing rights are protected against impairment by subduction
of water in hydraulically connected aquifers (or streams) caused by mine
dewatering is to be decided on an individual basis. Each affected well
(or surface point of diversion) must be identified, and existing extraction
equipment must be described and evaluated. Protection need not be pro-
vided for existing extraction facilities rendered ineffective by a decline
in the groundwater level attributable to continued appropriations under
existing vested or permitted rights, for wells formerly productive but now
abandoned or out of service, for "Mendenhall" wells whose construction
was begun before declaration of the groundwater basin but never perfected
with due diligence," or for wells that have failed to meet the conditions
of a permit prescribed by the State Engineer. By use of a digital model,
the effects of dewatering are projected across the basin and over the time
in which the pumping stress will be physically present in its saturated
materials. Each affected point of diversion can thus be separately iden-
tified, the expected decline in water level measured, and its economic
effects calculated. The P/R's "replacement" provisions are typically a
schedule of economic indemnities for which the applicant admits liability.
Initiation of a P/R rests with the new user. The statutory standard for
the State Engineer's approval of a P/R is whether it "avoids"'' 1 or
"prevents"' 1 2 impairment of existing rights. A somewhat different stan-
dard must be applied on complaint of the senior interest that his rights
are being impaired. The Engineer then determines whether this interest
is "protected" by the plan.103 The different standards seem to recognize
that approval of the P/R must be based on theoretical factors," while its
100. State ex rel. Reynolds v. Mendenhall, 68 N.M. 467, 362 P.2d 998 (1961).
101. N.M. Stat. Ann. §72-12A-3(D), -8(A) (1978).
102. N.M. Stat. Ann. §72-12A-3(E), -7(F) (1978).
103. N.M. Stat. Ann. §72-12A-7(H), -9(B), -9(C) (1978).
104. N.M. Stat. Ann. §72-12A-8(A) (1978).
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enforcement is based on the actual operation of the plan in practice. If
the P/R has not worked out as expected at the time of approval, the permit
can be suspended or terminated,' °5 and the parties thus forced to rene-
gotiate an amended plan. Or, if a dewatering permit was granted without
a plan, the Engineer may suspend or terminate the permit,'0 6 if a senior
interest shows impairment, thus exposing the mining company to im-
mediate termination of pumping and forcing the parties to bargain for a
P/R. The Engineer has no direct authority to impose a plan or an amend-
ment, but his power to suspend or terminate a permit and to withhold
approval of a P/R is equivalent to compulsory arbitration.
The applicant's ability to file a P/R with the State Engineer and request
approval despite a senior right's refusal to consent may be a powerful
advantage in the bargaining process, notwithstanding the P/R's legal
admission that the applicant's proposed activity will injure the scheduled
existing uses. The liability phase of the potential plaintiff's case is thus
proved by the defendant, the applicant. But he controls the schedule of
affected rights and the indemnities, supported by the model's projections.
Thereafter, negotiations about the proposed indemnities will be similar
to negotiations of a settlement of an action for damages for well inter-
ference, but the senior right is deprived of his power to threaten an
injunction to stop mine dewatering until a bargain is made.
If a substitute water supply is proposed by the P/R, the person furnishing
the water obtains a water right in the amount and for the use specified
in the P/R. 107 Where mine dewatering is involved, with no beneficial use
of the water, a water right could not arise. But furnishing the mine
discharge to the senior interest completes the appropriation and creates
the water right through the recipient's beneficial use.' 08 Since the recipient
of the substitute water supply does not lose his senior rights, 'I he con-
ceivably could sell his old rights for transfer elsewhere, substituting the
contractual provisions of the P/R as the basis for his supply.
The State Engineer cannot directly enforce the indemnities. The mining
company must fulfill the P/R "with all deliberate speed," which is prob-
ably equivalent to the "due diligence" requirement for completion of
works under the doctrine of relation back. Enforcement of the P/R is left
105. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 72-12A-9(B) (1978).
106. N.M. Stat. Ann. §72-12A-9(C) (1978).
107. N.M. Stat. Ann. §72-12A-7(G) (1978). Mathers v. Texaco, Inc., 77 N.M. 239, 421 P.2d
771 (1966).
108. An application for a dewatering permit with a P/R that proposes furnishing a substitute water
supply should fall under N.M. Stat. Ann. § 72-12A-3 (1978) rather than N.M. Stat. Ann. § 72-12A-
7(A) (1978). For simplicity, N.M. Stat. Ann. § 72-12A-7(G) (1978) expressly makes a separate
application unnecessary.
109. N.M. Stat. Ann. §72-12A-13 (1978).
January 19831
NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL
principally in the hands of the indemnitee; if he does not complain, the
Engineer cannot order payment of the indemnity. " 0
The "right of replacement" with compulsory indemnity for senior rights
may eventually be adopted by other states and supersede the non-im-
pairment concept as the basis of administrative control over western water
resources. New uses prohibited by impairment predicated on vague and
general hydrological analyses, without regard to actual deprivation of
water, may be initiated under a P/R at the cost of an actual indemnity,
payable at such time as a loss is imminently threatened or actually in-
cuffed, and limited to the cost of obviating the deprivation. Broad-scale
purchase and retirement of irrigated lands will no longer be necessary,
unless they would actually be forced out of production by subduction of
their supply. No longer can state water administrators ignore the long
periods between initiation of a new use and the manifestation of its effects.
The statutory right of replacement coupled with administrative, rather
than judicial, approval of the plan of replacement will probably allow
new appropriations at minimum cost. The fixed indemnities of the P/R
will certainly be less than the cost of purchasing outright the adversely
affected senior rights, and the cost would probably be less than a damage
award in a suit by aggrieved senior interests."'I
It is not yet apparent whether the P/R procedures prescribed by the
1980 Dewatering Act will be adequate to handle messy situations like
the widespread dewatering of the Westwater Canyon aquifer. Pumping
will occur at many locations, cones of depression will intersect and over-
lap, the same senior interests will be affected by more than one dewaterer,
and the multiple indemnities proposed by overlapping P/R's will require
both sophisticated models to calculate each company's proper share and
an administrative system to assure due payment of the proper indemnity
by each company. Since the mining companies involved have had ex-
110. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 72-12A-9 (1978). The State Engineer's permit, under N.M. Stat. Ann.
§ 72-12A-7(F) (1978) is "contingent upon implementation and maintenance of the plan." If the plan
were not in fact carried out, the State Engineer might sua sponte invoke the contingency and terminate
the permit.
11. Such plaintiffs would find it difficult to sue for an injunction (in the case of preenactment
dewatering or a non-dewatering withdrawal of groundwater) because proof of irreparable injury may
not be available in advance of actual impairment, Maestas v. Elephant Butte Irrigation Dist., No.
78-138B (D.N.M. May 11, 1979), and the statutory recognition that impairment could be obviated
by approved P/R indemnities may lead a court to find that the plaintiff has an adequate remedy at
law in an action for damages. A damage action would require proof of plaintiff's senior rights, the
nature and extent of its uses, the reduction of his available supply proximately caused by the
defendant's withdrawals, and the economic costs of reestablishing a reliable supply, or the direct
and consequential losses resulting from loss of the supply. Such evidence could also be presented
in the administrative proceeding to approve the P/R, and the scheduled indemnities could be the
same as judicially awarded damages. But a local jury may well have different concerns from the
State Engineer. To the extent P/R indemnities were less generous than a jury award, the administrative
procedure favors new uses.
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perience with complicated royalty interests, they should be equipped to
handle multiple water indemnities.
A company's contribution to the necessary indemnity for a well should
be proportionate to its contribution to the well's impairment during a
specified period. For a calendar year (or other period) the projected im-
pairment of an existing well will be so many feet, caused by so many
pumpers. An adequate "replacement" for that period should then be
provided at the expense of all such pumpers in proportion to their re-
spective projected effects for that interval, determined by agreement or
possibly by a governing model. If more pumpers appear over time, the
increasing impairment should be borne by the increased number of pum-
pers, who should contribute to the indemnity in proportion to their re-
spective incremental contributions to the impairment.
Since many pumpers will no doubt contribute to the impairment of
particular wells in different amounts for different periods, each individ-
ual's contribution to the impairment during each period should be sched-
uled. With the State Engineer's support, all P/R applicants might be
persuaded to sign an agreement with all adversely affected senior interests
so as to apportion the necessary indemnity for each impaired well. The
first permittee could be responsible for paying the indemnity for each
well impaired by its pumping, and its responsibility could continue as
long as its incremental projected pumping impaired the well. The re-
sponsible pumper would, under the agreement, collect the contributions
of junior pumpers to the total indemnity and see that the required "re-
placement" was actually made. Whenever its pumping ceased to con-
tribute to the impairment, its administrative chores as "responsible pumper"
would be passed on the next senior indemnitor for as long as its pumping
contributed to the impairment. If contractual administration of the in-
demnity system failed, the State Engineer might step in and enforce the
indemnities.
The P/R mechanism is workable only because computer models of
water basins have become feasible in the last several years. For complex,
multiparty arrangements, all parties may need to agree on a single model,
which will thus become the oracle of hydrological truth. The technical
ability appears to exist. Within the modeled basin, existing uses can be
displayed and the effects of proposed pumping projected, measurements
of effects in specilic nodes of the model surface are obtainable, and the
incremental effects of overlapping cones of depression can be taken into
account.
An accurate model would give the same answers as a direct physical
measurement. Indeed, the model may provide information that could not,
with present equipment and methods, be obtained directly; therefore, an
accurate model can be substituted for the physical reality for all relevant
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judicial and administrative purposes. However, an experienced model
maker recently stated that "a model is only an approximate representation
of the prototype system. . . . The state of the art of digital modeling does
not permit a [scientific] statement on the confidence limits bounding the
projections made by the model. . . . The confidence in the predicted
response to these simulated withdrawals [must be] based on the subjective
appraisal of the analogy between the [actual] aquifer system and the
model.""12 For P/R purposes, the authority of a model may be based on
a multiparty agreement or the State Engineer's discretion rather than
judicial approval after consideration of the evidence.
Although scientific study of surface water began in the second half of
the 17th century,"I3 measurement of the movement of groundwater began
with Darcy's Law in 1856. "4 The digital computer finally made reliable
models practical within the last 15 years."15 The basic requirements for
a valid model are an accurate description of the physical system, math-
ematical equations that describe correctly the shape, distribution, and
quantity of water in an aquifer and the flow of water both on and under
the earth, and proper description of the "boundaries" of the model area.1 16
Physically, a model consists of a set of Fortran commands, in print or
on cards or tape, which control a computer's calculations. The calcula-
tions produce a mathematical (numerical) description of the flow of water
in the system according to equations which describe or measure the
112. Glenn A. Hearne, Mathematical Model of the Tesuque Aquifer System Underlying Pojoaque
River Basin and Vicinity, New Mexico 4, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SERVICE OPEN FILE REP'T NO.
80-1023 (January, 1981).
113. Pierre Perrault (1608-1680) and Edme Marriotte (1620-1684) measured rainfall and sub-
sequent runoff; Edmund Halley (1656-1742) measured evaporation rates. 6 ENCYCLOPAEDIA
BRITANNICA 80(d) (1974).
114. Henri Darcy (1803-1858) measured the flow of water through sand and found that the
volume of water was proportionate to pressure and inversely proportionate to the thickness of the
bed. 8 ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA 438(b) (1974). A useful introduction, with appropriate
drawings, is Widman, supra note 83.
115. Dr. George F. Pinder's work was basic. Pinder & Bredehoeft, Application of the Digital
Computer for Aquifer Evaluation, 4 U.S. GEOLOGICAL SERVICE, WATER RESOURCES RE-
SEARCH NO. 4, at 1069-1093 (1968); Pinder, A Digital Model for Aquifer Evaluation, 7 U.S.
GEOLOGICAL SERVICE, TECHNIQUES OF WATER-RESOURCES INVESTIGATIONS ch. CI
(1970). The mathematical code was published in P. C. Trescott, Documentation of Finite-Difference
Model for Simulation of Three-Dimensional Ground-Water Flow, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SERVICE
OPEN FILE REPORT NO. 75-483 (1975), Supp. 76-591 (1976); Trescott, Pinder & Larson, Finite
Difference Modelfor Aquifer Simulation in Two Dimensions with Results of Numerical Experiments,
7 U.S. GEOLOGICAL SERVICE, SURVEY TECHNIQUES & WATER-RESOURCES INVES-
TIGATIONS ch. CI (1976); and Posson, Heame, Tracy & Frenzel, Computer Program for Simulating
Ground-Water Flow in Three Dimensions, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SERVICE OPEN FILE REPORT
NO. 80-421 (1980).
116. The following eight paragraphs have been derived from Exhibit US-126 in State vs. Aamodt,
No. 6639-M Civil, D.N.M. (Pinder & Balleau, SIMULATION OF THE POJOAQUE GROUND-
WATER BASIN (1980)).
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interrelationships of significant parameters." 7 Values are assigned ac-
cording to observed characteristics of the real system for the reservoir's
ability to store ("specific storage" and "specific yield")" 8 and to redis-
tribute water among localities with differing water levels ("hydraulic
conductivity") 9 and to accommodate different pumpage rates ("stress").
The governing equations are, by themselves, an incomplete description
of the system. Further information is required to describe the model's
117. "The equation for three-dimensional flow of groundwater in a porous medium can be written
similarly to Trescott (1975) as
d dh d dh d dh dhd (K x ) + d (K, -yy) + d (K, 
-z) 
-S' + W(x,y,z,t)
dx dx dy dy dz: dz = 'dt +Wxyzt
where,
K,, Ky, and K. are the hydraulic conductivities in the x, y, and z directions (L/T);
h is the hydraulic head (L);
S, is the specific storage (L-');
W is the volume of water released from or taken into storage per unit volume of the porous medium
per unit time, and represents a source-sink term (T-'); and
t is time (T)." The equation is given in Hearne, supra note 112, at 9.
118. "Water is stored in the Tesuque aquifer system in both confined and unconfined conditions.
Therefore, it was necessary to estimate both the specific storage and the specific yield. Under confined
conditions, a decrease in hydraulic head is associated with expansion of the water and compression
of the porous medium. Similarly, an increase in hydraulic head is associated with compression of
the water and expansion of the porous medium. The specific storage is the volume of water released
from or taken into storage per unit volume of the porous medium in response to a unit change in
hydraulic head.
"The compaction of the porous medium associated with declines in hydraulic head is a combination
of elastic and inelastic (plastic) deformation. Elastic deformation is fully reversible if the hydraulic
head returns to the initial condition. Plastic deformation is irreversible. Available data only are
adequate to estimate the specific storage due to elastic compaction. Compaction of sandy beds is
typically elastic. Clay or silty beds typically contain more water per unit volume, release the water
more slowly, and undergo more plastic deformation than sandy beds. The amount of plastic defor-
mation to be expected from a clay or silty bed depends on the geologic history of the bed. Because
of the permanence of the deformation, a bed will have very little plastic deformation until the stress
exceeds the maximum stress to which the bed has been subjected. Because of this threshold effect
and the slow release of water, the development of a ground-water reservoir (which generally produces
a large change in hydraulic head after a long time) may produce plastic deformation that was not
determined during aquifer tests (which generally produce a small change in hydraulic head after a
short time)." Hearne, supra note 112, at 16.
"For unconfined conditions, the change of the volume of water in storage per unit area as the
result of a unit change in hydraulic head is produced primarily by the draining or filling of pore
space. This change is dependent upon pore size, rate of change of the water surface, and time. Only
an approximate measure of the relationship between hydraulic head and storage is obtainable for
unconfined conditions. This measure is the specific yield." Hearne, supra note 112, at 17.
119. "The ability of an aquifer to transmit water can be described by the hydraulic conductivity
or by the transmissivity. Hydraulic conductivity is the volume of water that will flow in unit time
through a unit area under a unit hydraulic gradient. Transmissivity is the product of the hydraulic
conductivity and the saturated thickness. For an ideal aquifer, transmissivity may be determined by
aquifer tests conducted using wells that are open to the total thickness of the aquifer. . . .Trans-
missivity also may be estimated from specific-capacity data. The specific capacity of a well is the
ratio of the rate at which water is withdrawn to the drawdown of water level in the well." Hearne,
supra note 112, at 9.
January 1983]
NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL
boundaries, which typically are connections between an aquifer and sur-
face water or impermeable material ("boundary conditions"), and to
describe the water levels in the model area at a specified time ("initial
conditions"). The governing equations, augmented by the specified boundary
and initial water-level conditions, constitute a complete mathematical
description of the hydrologic system. To the degree that a mathematical
model is an accurate realization of the physical system, it can be used to
forecast the response of the system to current or proposed water uses or
development programs.
The equations governing groundwater flow in a system are well estab-
lished and can be found in the scientific literature.' 20 The numerical
procedure employed in the approximation of these equations is the well
established method of finite differences. The specific finite-difference
formulation (the program) and the computational scheme (the algorithm)
used to solve the resulting set of algebraic equations are also readily
available in the scientific literature. 121
Boundary conditions consist of information specified a priori at the
boundaries of the model. The boundaries include locations where ground-
water is in contact with adjacent bodies of surface water, the atmosphere,
impermeable rock units, or simply where the extent of the model area is
arbitrarily delimited because conditions in the model area have no sig-
nificant effects at greater distances. In groundwater-flow simulation,
boundary conditions can have three forms: specified constant flow, spec-
ified hydraulic head with variable flow, and a "Cauchy condition" which
specifies the relationships between the hydraulic head and the flow. Initial
conditions consist of the specification of water levels everywhere within
the model area at some initial reference time.
A complete hydrologic model for the study of water quantities consists
of the governing equations with their terms, boundary conditions and
initial hydraulic head specified. A valuable but somewhat less complete
model may be based on steady-state conditions, in which the volume and
schedule of flow does not change and water levels do not rise or fall so
that storage properties can be ignored. In this "steady" case, calculations
are based on fewer terms than in the comprehensive model. The steady
water-level elevation and flow rate at any point in the three-dimensional
region of flow can be described and compared to other observed data for
steady conditions. Historical or future changes in the flow system are not
considered. This steady-state modeling procedure is useful in preliminary
model calibration.
120. See, for example, PINDER & GRAY, FINITE ELEMENT SIMULATION IN SURFACE
AND SUBSURFACE HYDROLOGY, ch. 5 (Academic Press 1977).
121. See, for example, Trescott, supra note 115 (1975), and Trescott & Larson, supra note 115
(1976).
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Sometimes, a steady-state solution is an appropriate initial condition
for a more complete (non-steady or transient) simulation. The transient
simulation then makes it possible to include information on aquifer storage
properites and on the amount and schedule of flow changes, such as well
pumpage or river diversions, as part of a water development program.
The model is displayed as a surface map subdivided into a number of
rectangles ("nodes"). Within each rectangle the hydraulic head is as-
sumed to behave linearly. Thus, the finite-difference model approximates
the physics of the natural system with an accuracy related to the shape
of the natural system and the size of the rectangles. The model area is
chosen sufficiently large in the areal plan that behavior at the edges (or
boundaries) does not significantly affect simulation within the area of
interest; thus, larger rectangles are used near the model edges where a
high degree of resolution, in the form of information per square mile, is
neither required nor achieved.
The model requires values for the parameters that describe the aquifer
material (for the governing equations), specification of the nature of the
flow at boundaries, and knowledge of the initial water levels. Where the
.aquifer is composed of interbedded layers of gravel, sand, silt, and clay
and dips below the horizontal in a certain direction, hydraulic conductivity
may vary according to direction ("anisotropy"), and a correct simulation
requires a three-dimensional anisotrophic model. Anisotropy can be ac-
commodated through a judicious choice of grid orientation; an orientation
aligned with the major trend of field conditions requires the specification
of only three of the possible nine hydraulic conductivity components of
an arbitrarily oriented system. Each element of a three-dimensional model
may be visualized as one of a series of bricks representing three-dimen-
sional cells. 22 The aquifer's hydraulic properties are derived from aquifer
tests and other field studies, published information, and laboratory anal-
122. Hearne, supra note 112, at 9 elaborates:
To simulate a three-dimensional flow system, the description of the aquifer system
provided by the conceptual model is subdivided in a large number of cubical cells.
The continuous physical properties of the porous medium (that is, the ability to
store and transmit water) are represented as discrete functions of space by assuming
them to be uniform within each cell. Heterogeneity is possible because the physical
properties may vary from cell to cell. The hydraulic head associated with each cell
is the hydraulic head at the center of the cell. At each cell, a finite-difference
approximation for the derivatives in the three-dimensional flow equation yields an
algebraic equation in seven unknowns (hydraulic head in the cell and hydraulic head
in each of six adjacent cells). For a model with N cells, a set of N simultaneous
equations in N unknowns is generated. The simulation program solves this set of
simultaneous equations subject to prescribed initial and boundary conditions. Refer
to Trescott (1975) and Trescott, Pinder, & Larson (1976) [see supra note 115] for
details of the solution algorithm. The computer program used for this study (Posson
and others, 1980) evolved from that of Trescott.
Hearne, supra note 112, at 9.
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ysis. Nevertheless, parameter values cannot be precisely measured em-
pirically. To validate the properties assigned to the model, a "calibration"
procedure is essential: the model is asked to reproduce the general hy-
drologic characteristics of the actual area, as disclosed in pumping tests,
known steady-state water levels, and a realistic actual water balance
between streams and aquifer in the area.
Once the values of aquifer properties have been validated in that man-
ner, the appropriate boundary conditions must be specified and again
validated through calibration, by determining the model's ability to re-
produce historical water levels within the basin. Impermeable boundaries
represent the contact between the aquifer and the relatively impermeable
rocks of mountain ranges, faults, or other structures. The base of the
model is also an impermeable boundary at a depth specified according
to known or estimated geologic measurements. Constant head values
simulate contact between the aquifer and rivers in the nodes of the model
where the head is maintained at the elevation of the stream bed as esti-
mated from topographic maps. A limited source boundary is a Cauchy
boundary condition in mathematical nomenclature, which allows water
to enter the node according to the vertical head gradient at that node.
Thus, the rate of infiltration cannot exceed the water available in the
stream nor a designated maximum infiltration rate determined by the
proportionality constant coupling the head gradient and the flow through
the stream bed. Constant-flow boundary conditions may be specified to
account for infiltration and seepage from adjacent mountains and to ac-
commodate consumptive use by native vegetation. Incorrect boundary
conditions, like erroneous hydrologic parameters, can drastically distort
the model, making it affirmatively misleading. Therefore, calibration is
essential to construction of a reliable model.
Since the values used for the hydrological parameters are only wise
approximations in the best cases, and the actual depth of saturated sed-
iments throughout a basin often has not been precisely measured, the
forecasts derived from a digital model are not equivalent in scientific
reliability to astronomical forecasts of solar eclipses. Nevertheless, a good
model is far superior to the earlier administrative fortunetelling, which
governed "resource management" for the last three-quarters of a century.
Basin models constructed as the basis for a P/R to support a new
appropriation or necessary mine dewatering can finally form the foun-
dations of an effective market to allocate water among those who need
it. The model will organize the essential market information concerning
the geohydrological reality (the supply) and the existing water uses (the
demand); it will specify the interests that must be "purchased" (the in-
cremental impairments) and provide a basis for establishing a price (the
indemnity). The deals that result will not be free of coercion; the reluctant
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senior interest, unable to stop the proposed pumping, may see his supply
disappear because of permitted pumping and face a Hobson's choice of
negotiations to improve a P/R indemnity or a suit for damages based on
the same data but with the uncertainty of a jury verdict after a spirited
defense. However, the procedure will permit "purchase" of less than
entire senior interests. Both existing and additional water-users will con-
tinue to share the resource, and the cost of developing the new use should
be substantially less than the costs of achieving a complete substitution
of new for old users.
The "right of replacement" has superseded the non-impairment rule,
just as the latter superseded open appropriation. Public resources will, at
least in part, be redirected from water projects to the technical data
required to create acceptable basin models. Administrative discretion will
be structured by the models; they will become the key resource manage-
ment tool. Lurking in every cranny are justiciable issues that eventually
will be litigated. All things considered, the interplay among existing and
new users, administrators, scientists and engineers, courts and lawyers,
and structured markets is more promising than at the creation of the water
bureaucracies 75 years ago.
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